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1 This collective book signed by eminent contributors updates an agenda (to take up a
theme addressed by Joseph Agassi) that is crucial for the social sciences: the question of
rationality. The enigma posed by the concept here is not, as one might have thought in
the first instance, the mystery of the faculty it identifies but, while this is undoubtedly
related, the mystery of the notion itself, given the apparent impossibility of defining it
scientifically  in  a  consensual  manner.  Like  the  anthology of  dichotomies  classically
evoked in the literature to circumscribe it: normative versus descriptive, instrumental
versus non-instrumental,  intentional  versus unintentional,  etc.,  the  book’s  fifteen
contributions  (presented  without  any  particular  structure)  offer  an  overall
impressionistic picture, allowing the reader to get an idea of the state of the art on the
subject in the social sciences. Since it is impossible to give a precise account of the
arguments developed in each of the articles, I will mention only a few facets of this
central notion that can be discovered when reading The Mystery of Rationality.
2 Let us begin with what is probably the most provocative idea of the collection, based on
the observation that the concept of rationality, one of those most often used in the
social  sciences,  is  too  often  poorly  defined  by  researchers  and  used  according  to
different  meanings,  so  that  it  could ultimately  be advantageously  abandoned (Karl-
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Dieter Opp, “Do the Social Sciences Need the Concept of ‘Rationality’? Notes on the
Obsession with a Concept”, Chapter 13). But while some empiricist approaches confine
themselves to behaviorism, rational models of the social and economic actor seem to
express  a  fundamental  need for  understanding in  the  form of  an  interpretation of
human action as conscious (Emmanuel Picavet, “Rationality and Interpretation in the
Study of Social Interaction”, Chapter 15). In this regard, the opposition between the
conscious  level  of  thought,  generally  reserved  for  rational  processes,  and  the
unconscious level, or between intentionality and the absence of intention, neglects the
“subconscious” level and, correlatively, the question of subconscious intention, which
would require a deepening in this sense of the idea of intentionality (Alban Bouvier,
“Intentional,  Unintentional  and  Sub-intentional  Aspects  of  Social  Mechanisms  and
Rationality: The Example of Commitments in Political Life”, Chapter 3). The interplay of
“embodied”  forms  of  rationality  should  also  be  considered  (Shaun  Gallagher,
“Embodied Rationality”, Chapter 7). 
3 Nevertheless,  the question of  consciousness  is  given as  a  methodological  device,  or
even a heuristic, participating in the enterprise of meaningful interpretation, rather
than as a factual assumption. Subjective rational reasoning involves both explicit and
implicit  types  of  argumentation.  “Good  reasons”  are  those  which,  in  one  way  or
another, are generalizable and thus understandable inter-subjectively when situational
contexts are reconstructed to account for the elements of subjectivity involved (Enzo Di
Nuoscio, “On the Explanation of Human Action: ‘Good Reasons’,  Critical Rationalism
and Argumentation Theory”, Chapter 4). On this basis, we can understand, for example,
why the cognitive purpose of magic is not fundamentally different from that of science,
inasmuch as it is not the symbolic dimension as such that differentiates them, but its
meaning  in  relation  to  the  global  intellectual  context  of  societies  (Ian  Jarvie,
“Rationality and Irrationality Revisited or Intellectualism Vindicated or How Stands the
Problem of the Rationality of Magic?” Chapter 9). 
4 Moreover, the mathematically convenient and normative conception of rationality as
maximization  (of  utility,  profit,  etc.)  developed  by  neoclassical  economics  can  be
contrasted with the criticisms of the first  generation of behavioral economists.  The
latter emphasized the importance of the point of view of decision-making processes
rather than results, taking into account the cognitive limits of reason, its interpretative
dimension, as well  as routine behavior,  or even lack of reflection or motivation for
efficiency (Roger Frantz, “First Generation Behavioral Economists on Rationality, and
Its Limits”, Chapter 6). In this respect, the motivational role of emotions in the revision
of beliefs and preferences should be taken into consideration (Pierre Livet, “Dynamics
of Rationality and Dynamics of Emotions”,  Chapter 11).  And if  reason is  a means of
introducing coherence into our goals and preferences, then both the strong, normative
approach of rationality and the weak approach, involving the idea of intelligible or
meaningful  action,  imply  a  conception  of  the  good  (Paul  Dumouchel,  “Rationality,
Irrationality, Realism and the Good”, Chapter 5). But it should also be noted that the
rational  actor  model  used  in  decision  theory  is  based  on  axioms  of  completeness,
transitivity of preferences and independence of irrelevant alternatives, which involve
neither optimization nor conditions of  validity of  endorsed beliefs.  This is  why, for
example, the biases of judgment observed in cognitive psychology do not betray it, as is
too  often  believed  (Herbert  Gintis,  “Rational  Choice  Explained  and  Defended”,
Chapter 8). 
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5 Finally, if we address the question of long-term choices related to the lives of social
actors, then the notion of rationality implies in-depth the meaning of action for the
actor,  independent  of  any  a  priori planning  (Daniel  Little,  “Rational  Life  Plans?”,
Chapter 10). We could, it should be noted, bring this point of view closer to the notion
of personality in Max Weber’s work, which is expressed in the internal link of action to
values: the ultimate values and meanings that individuals give to their life take shape
through various objectives depending on the context. 
6 In the course of the discussion led by each of the contributors, points of view that have
marked reflection on the subject in the social sciences are examined or confronted.
These include those of Max Weber, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper,
Carl  Hempel,  William Dray,  Herbert  Simon,  Robin Horton,  Steven Lukes,  Jon Elster,
Raymond Boudon and others. It is therefore an important book for anyone interested in
the issue of rationality in the social sciences, in line with the major collective works
devoted  to  the  subject,  such  as  Rationality (B. R.  Wilson [ed.],  1970,  Oxford,  Basil
Blackwell), Rationality To-day / La Rationalité aujourd’hui (T. F. Geraets [ed.], 1979, Ottawa,
The University of  Ottawa Press),  or  the anthology Rationality  in  Action.  Contemporary
Approaches (P. K. Moser [ed.], 1990, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) or else the
recent Rationality in the Social Sciences. The Schumpeter-Parsons Seminar 1939-40 and Current
Perspectives (H. Staubmann and V. Lidz [eds], 2018, New York, Springer), none of which
is obsolete, since discussions of this concept, even when they seem to touch it only on
the periphery, engage it entirely and can still participate in broadening views about it.
But one must admit a certain disappointment, since this reading does not allow us to
lift the mystery which surrounds the concept of rationality, quite the contrary.
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